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This paper provides empirical evidence on the dynamic e⁄ects of un-
certainty on ￿rm-level capital accumulation. A novelty in this paper is
that the ￿rm-level uncertainty indicator is motivated and derived from a
theoretical model, the neoclassical investment model with time to build.
This model also serves as the base for the empirical work, where an error-
correction approach is employed. I ￿nd a negative e⁄ect of uncertainty on
capital accumulation, both in the short and the long run. This outcome
cannot be explained by the model alone. Instead, the results suggest that
the predominant mechanism at work stems from irreversibility constraints.
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11 Introduction
What is the e⁄ect on current investments of increased uncertainty about fu-
ture returns to capital? Theoretically, there is no unambiguous answer to this
question. The literature emphasizing the convexity of the marginal returns to
capital, e.g. Hartman (1972) and Abel (1983), ￿nds that increased uncertainty
should raise investments. In contrast, the literature stressing the irreversibil-
ity of capital outlays ￿nds that investments are depressed when uncertainty
increases (see e.g. Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). Moreover, the long-run predic-
tions are even more intricate, since the prediction for the short-run e⁄ect of
increased uncertainty on investment in the irreversible case does not carry over
to the long-run stock of capital. Although the short-run e⁄ect is negative, the
long-run e⁄ect is ambiguous in this case (see e.g. Caballero, 1999). Thus, the
dynamic e⁄ects of uncertainty on capital accumulation constitute an empirical
question.
This paper addresses the investment-uncertainty relationship, using a panel
of Swedish manufacturing ￿rms.1 The focus on the ￿rm-level has several advan-
tages relative to studies on more aggregate data, which constitute the majority
of the existing literature (see e.g. the survey by Carruth, Dickerson and Henley,
2000). First, a disaggregate measure of uncertainty makes it possible to account
for heterogeneous variation in uncertainty, which is likely to cancel out on a more
aggregate level. Second, as noted by Carruth et al. (2000), feedback e⁄ects from
investments to aggregate uncertainty should be a much smaller problem when
focusing on the ￿rm-level. Finally, there is the advantage of being able to control
for ￿rm-speci￿c heterogeneity through ￿xed e⁄ects.
As a framework for the theoretical and the empirical work, I use a neo-
classical investment model. In the benchmark model, it is assumed that the
capital stock must be chosen one period in advance, whereas other factors can
be adjusted within the period. The motivation for this assumption is that the
1The focus in the paper is on equipment and machinery capital. Henceforth, I will use the
term capital synonymously with equipment and machinery capital.
2installation of new capital goods is time consuming. Thus, investment outlays
today should a⁄ect the productive capacity of the capital stock tomorrow.
The benchmark model is used to derive an expression for the desired stock
of capital under the assumption that the ￿rm treats expected values as certain.
This measure is employed in the empirical speci￿cation to capture the invest-
ment incentives of the ￿rm if uncertainty was ignored. A cash ￿ ow measure
is also included to control for potential credit constraints. Finally, a ￿rm-level
measure of uncertainty is added to this speci￿cation to study the e⁄ect of un-
certainty on capital accumulation.
A novelty in this paper is that the theoretical model is used to derive a
￿rm-level measure of uncertainty in terms of observables. In general, three dif-
ferent approaches have been taken in the literature to obtain such measures.
First, the volatility of the estimated forecast error from a forecasting equation
for operating pro￿ts is used by von Kalckreuth (2000) and Bo (1999).2 Relative
to these studies, the approach of this paper is a step in the direction of pro-
viding micro-foundations for the measure of uncertainty. A Second approach by
Guiso and Parigi (1999) and Patillo (1998) is to use survey data on the distrib-
ution of managers￿subjective perception of uncertainty. Although this measure
corresponds closely to what we want to measure, the usual caveats regarding
survey data apply. Moreover, the availability of such data is very limited. Fi-
nally, several studies, e.g. by Bloom, Bond and van Reenen (2001) and Leahy
and Whited (1996); use an uncertainty measure based on the volatility of the
￿rms￿stock price. The downside of this approach is that the volatility in stock
prices may be driven by speculative bubbles which are unrelated to the rate of
return of investment (Shiller, 1989). Furthermore, the sample in such a study
is naturally limited to listed companies.
The ￿rm-level uncertainty measure derived in this paper captures the volatil-
ity in technology and the price of ￿ exible factors. Increasing the uncertainty
about these determinants of the revenue side of the marginal returns to capital
2This approach has also been applied to more aggregate data, e.g. in Ghosal and Loungani
(2000) who use U.S. four-digit (SIC) industry data.
3will increase investment in the theoretical model. This is due to the convexity of
the future marginal returns to capital; since the ￿ exible factor can be adjusted
after that the uncertainty has been dispelled, the future marginal revenue of cap-
ital will be a convex function in both technology and the price of ￿ exible factors.
Increased variation in technology and the price of ￿ exible factors therefore raises
the expected marginal revenue of capital. However, if capital is irreversible we
expect a counteracting e⁄ect (at least in the short-run), stemming from the
option value of waiting when future marginal returns to capital are uncertain.
When both mechanisms are at work, the net e⁄ect is ambiguous (see Pindyck,
1993).
As noted above, the dynamics of the e⁄ect of uncertainty on capital accumu-
lation may be quite intricate. To allow for a separation of the short-run e⁄ects
from the e⁄ects on the long-run capital stock, I use an error-correction approach
in the empirical work.
The main ￿ndings are that (i) uncertainty has a negative e⁄ect on capital
accumulation in the short as well as in the long run. Thus, the neoclassical
model with time to build cannot alone explain the data. Instead, the ￿nding of
a negative e⁄ect supports the view that the predominant e⁄ect stems from irre-
versible capital expenditures as opposed to the convexity of the future marginal
returns to capital channel. (ii) The short-run e⁄ect of increased uncertainty
is large, whereas the long-run e⁄ect is more moderate. The estimates imply
that an increase of one (within) standard deviation in the uncertainty measure
reduces investment by 16 percent on impact and, if the increase is permanent,
the long-run stock of capital will decrease by 2 percent.
Although there is considerable variation in the literature across the mea-
sures for capturing uncertainty, the overall evidence points towards a negative
investment-uncertainty relationship. Using a theory based speci￿cation and
￿rm-level data, this paper adds more evidence in this direction.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the benchmark model
and derives the desired stock of capital when the ￿rm treats expected values
as certain. Section 3 discusses the theoretical predictions for the investment-
4uncertainty relationship and derives the uncertainty indicator. Section 4 dis-
cusses the data. Section 5 derives the empirical speci￿cation and discusses
econometric issues. Section 6 presents the results and section 7 concludes.
2 Model
The neoclassical model derived in this section draws on Caballero, Engel and
Haltiwanger (1995) and Carlsson and LasØen (2002). Let the ￿rm￿ s production





t ; ￿ > 0; ￿ > 0 and ￿ + ￿ < 1; (1)
where A is an index measuring technology, K is the stock of capital and F
an index of other ￿ exible factors of production. It is assumed that only the
stock of capital is associated with adjustment impediments - all other variable
factors, F, are ￿ exible.3 Moreover, the production function is assumed to exhibit
decreasing returns to scale. In period t, the ￿rm produces its output, using the
capital stock from period t ￿ 1, where a time period represent a year in this
model. The time to build assumption is reasonable because the installation of
new capital goods is time consuming (see e.g. Hall (1977) and Nickel (1978)
for empirical evidence) and the stock of capital is measured at the end of the
period. The timing within each period is as follows: ￿rst, shocks are realized
and second, adjustments are made to ￿ exible factors and the period￿ s investment
decision is made. Third, production takes place and ￿nally, capital adjustments
become productive.
The pro￿t for the ￿rm is given by:
￿t = Yt ￿ PF;tFt ￿ CtKt￿1; (2)
3Although this latter assumption can be criticized on grounds of e.g. labor adjustment cost,
the main share of production factors other than capital is intermediate materials. Intermediate
materials account for about 68 percent of the total costs in Swedish manufacturing (computed
using the data underlying Carlsson, 2003), whereas labor accounts for about 25 percent.
5where PF is the real price of ￿ exible factors and C is the real cost of capital.










Substituting (3) back into (1), gives an expression for output when ￿ exible














Next, a theoretical construct, i.e. the frictionless stock of capital, is de￿ned,
which is used to develop a base for the empirical work. Let frictionless capital,
e Kt, be de￿ned as the Kt￿1 the ￿rm would like to have had in period t after















1￿￿ = Ct, (5)
where (3) has been used to eliminate ￿ exible factors. At and PF;t are not directly










t￿1 = Ct: (6)









where ￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)=(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿) > 1. This expression then gives the ratio of the
frictionless stock of capital to the actual stock of capital, in terms of observable
variables.
So far, nothing has been said about how the ￿rm actually chooses the stock
of capital. Since production takes place with the stock of capital lagged one
period, what is of importance for the ￿rm when deciding upon the size of the
capital adjustment in period t is the expectation of the conditions in period
t + 1. If we then make the thought experiment that the ￿rm treats expected
















where the latter expression is given by solving (5) for e Kt, forwarding this ex-
pression one period and substituting the expected values for the realizations of
At+1, PF;t+1 and Ct+1. This type of behavior is labeled the certainty equivalent
controller scheme.4
I assume that the processes for At, PF;t and Ct can be approximated as
Xt = Xt￿1￿X;t, where the shocks ￿X;t are assumed to have a constant mean
over time, but may have a time varying variance. Since the capital choice in
period t is taken after the realization of the shocks in period t, it follows that
Et(Xt+1) = XtEt(￿X;t+1) = XtE(￿X). Using this result, (8) can be rewritten
as:












Thus, if the ￿rm (i) applies a certainty equivalent controller scheme and (ii) does
not face any adjustment impediments, but must choose the stock of capital in
advance, the desired stock in period t, i.e. e K0
t, will be equal to the product of
the frictionless stock of capital and a constant, which depends on the means of
the exogenous shocks to which the ￿rm is subject. Combining (7) and (9), the
log deviation between e k0
t, and the actual stock of capital in period t, kt￿1, can
be expressed as:
e k0
t ￿ kt￿1 = ￿ [yt ￿ kt￿1 ￿ ct + v]; (10)
where lower case letters denote the log of the variable and v is a sum of constants,
including expressions of the means of the shocks to the exogenous determinants.
Intuitively, expression (10) implies that the deviation between the desired stock
of capital under the certainty equivalent controller scheme and the actual stock
of capital before adjustment is proportional to the imbalance in a Jorgensonian
4This terminology is taken from the engineering literature on servomechanisms (see e.g.
Bertsekas, 1976) where it is used to denote a control scheme where uncertainty about future
outcomes is neglected.
7(neoclassical) ￿rst-order condition for capital. Equation (10) will be used as the
base for the empirical work.
3 The E⁄ect of Uncertainty
This section ￿rst discusses the e⁄ects on the optimal choice of capital of dropping
the certainty equivalent controller scheme in the environment outlined above.
This experiment highlights the e⁄ects of the convexity of the future marginal
returns to capital. Second, the e⁄ects of irreversibility constraints on the capital
adjustment process are discussed.
In a frictionless world where the stock of capital is chosen one period ahead,







































From (11), it follows that the ￿rm faces three di⁄erent sources of uncertainty
about the future marginal returns to capital, i.e., uncertainty about At+1, PF;t+1
and Ct+1. By assuming that the distribution of the shocks to these processes




























￿ CtE (￿C) = 0; (13)
which states that the optimal stock of capital is given by the stock of capital
equating the expected marginal revenue of capital with the expected real cost
of capital. Since the power of Kt, i.e. ￿1=￿, is negative, the expected marginal
revenue will be a decreasing (convex) function in Kt. Moreover, the power of





PF;t+1 are convex functions in their arguments.












8are increasing in the the standard deviation of ￿A;t+1 and ￿PF;t+1, respectively.
Thus, increased uncertainty about future realizations of At+1 and PF;t+1 raises
the expected marginal revenue of capital and, hence, the optimal stock of capital.
However, since ￿Ct+1 enters (12) linearly, increased uncertainty about the real
cost of capital will have no e⁄ect on the optimal choice of capital.
To see the underlying intuition for these results, the key insight is that when
the ￿ exible factor can be adjusted after shocks have occurred, the realized mar-
ginal returns to capital will be a convex function in the realizations of technology
and the price of ￿ exible factors. However, because the capital stock cannot be
adjusted, uncertainty about the real cost of capital is of no importance. That
is, the realized marginal returns to capital will be a linear function of the real-
ization of the real cost of capital. The positive e⁄ect on capital accumulation
arising from uncertainty when the future marginal returns to capital is a convex
function of the uncertain variable was demonstrated by Hartman (1972), and
later extended by Abel (1983).
To capture the uncertainty in technology and the price of ￿ exible factors,

















The standard deviation of the shocks to at and pF;t, expressed as a single index,
can then be measured from:
￿￿;t = ln￿t ￿ ln￿t￿1: (16)
In practice, it is assumed that the ￿rm estimates the next periods￿standard
deviation of the shock from the standard deviation of recent shocks. The current
shock is included, since it is assumed that the ￿rm can observe this shock before
any decision regarding capital adjustment is made. The standard deviation of
shocks to at and pF;t, i.e. ￿￿￿;t, is then computed as the sample standard
9deviation of ￿￿;t, ￿￿;t￿1 and ￿￿;t￿2. From (15) it follows that to compute ￿t,
we ￿rst need a measure of ￿=(1 ￿ ￿). As argued by Caballero et al. (1995),
1=(1￿￿), where ￿ is the average cost share of equipment capital in total revenue,
provides a good approximation of ￿ (= (1 ￿ ￿)=(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)) for a range of
reasonable assumptions. Therefore, ￿=(1 ￿ ￿) is approximated by ￿.5
The measure ￿￿￿;t is the relevant uncertainty measure for the neoclassical
￿rm facing a time to build constraint, described above. Note that ￿t is akin to
the ￿rm￿ s capacity utilization. This should be contrasted to what has been used
as uncertainty measures previously in the literature, like e.g. stock price volatil-
ity or the volatility in the forecast error for operating pro￿ts. Although, these
latter measures should be positively associated with the volatility in capacity
utilization, one should not expect a perfect correlation between them.
If no other mechanism, beside time to build is at work we should, as ar-
gued above, expect a positive e⁄ect of uncertainty and capital accumulation. A
counteracting e⁄ect on investment from increased uncertainty arises, however,
if capital outlays are sunk costs; i.e. if investments are irreversible. The irre-
versibility literature emphasizes the option value of postponing an investment
project, when capital expenditures are sunk costs.6 The option value of wait-
ing is increasing in the degree of uncertainty about the future rate of returns
from the project. In other words, ceteris paribus, higher uncertainty depresses
current investment.7 Though, if the convexity channel is also at work, the net
5Note that ￿=(1 ￿ ￿) = (￿ ￿ 1)=￿ ￿ ￿.
6The irreversibility literature was ￿rst summarized, and extended, in Dixit and Pindyck
(1994).
7Although there is no e⁄ect on investment of uncertainty about the expected real cost of
capital in the base line model, it should a⁄ect the investment decision if capital is irreversible.
That is, since the option value of waiting will be a⁄ected. Given that the variation in the
real cost of capital can be controlled for by including time-e⁄ects (as argued below), this
e⁄ect should also be captured by the time-e⁄ects. In preliminary work I experimented with
including a measure of uncertainty in the real cost of capital, based on a standard neoclassical
measure of the latter variable, in the empirical speci￿cation. This does not change any of the
conclusions and, moreover, the results suggest that this type of uncertainty also has a negative
e⁄ect on investment.
10e⁄ect of increased uncertainty on irreversible investment depends on the change
in the option value, relative to the positive e⁄ect on the expected marginal re-
turns to capital. Dixit and Pindyck (1994, ch. 11) develop a formal model that
illustrates this trade-o⁄.
However, even if the option value e⁄ect dominates in the short-run, the long-
run e⁄ect on the capital stock from higher uncertainty is ambiguous in models
with irreversible capital. The irreversibility constraint implies, on one hand,
that the ￿rm is restrained from adjusting the stock of capital downwards in
bad times and, for a given capital stock, increased uncertainty makes it more
likely for this constraint to be binding. But, one the other hand, increased
uncertainty increase the reluctance to invest in good times. Thus, the net e⁄ect
on the average, or the long-run, stock of capital is ambiguous (see e.g. Caballero,
1999).
4 Data
The data used in this paper is a balanced panel of Swedish manufacturing ￿rms
drawn from the CoSta database (described in Hansen, 1999). This database
is, in turn, based on Enterprises - Financial Accounts collected by Statistics
Sweden and contains annual data for non-￿nancial ￿rms located in Sweden.
Given the availability of data and after standard cleaning procedures, described
in Appendix A, the data set consists of 341 ￿rms observed over the period 1979
- 1994. The capital stocks are estimated using the perpetual inventory method
(see the Appendix A).
The sample is ended in 1992 in order to avoid the turbulent years following in
the aftermath of the abandonment of the ￿xed exchange rate in November 1992.
Then, given the data requirements of the baseline speci￿cation and the estima-
tion method applied (see below), the e⁄ective sample used in the estimation is
1986 - 1992.
115 Empirical Speci￿cation
To derive the empirical speci￿cation, I start by specifying an expression for the
desired stock of capital, k￿
t. As a base for this, I use the expression for the desired
stock of capital under the certainty equivalent controller scheme, e k0
t, presented
in equation (10). In the empirical work I take a ￿ exible approach, akin to the
approach of Bloom et al. (2001), Mairesse, Hall and Mulkay (1999) and others,
by assuming that the variation in the real cost of capital can be controlled for
by time e⁄ects. The desired stock of capital might also be a⁄ected by cash ￿ ow
e⁄ects, working through, e.g., ￿nancial constraints by creating a higher required
rate of return for external ￿nancing (see e.g. Chirinko and Schaller, 1995, for
a discussion). Following Bloom et al. (2001); cash ￿ ow relative to (lagged)
capital, cft, is therefore included in the expression for desired capital to control
for cash ￿ ow e⁄ects. Finally, uncertainty is allowed to a⁄ect the desired stock
of capital. The desired stock of capital for ￿rm i, i.e. k￿
i;t, can then be written
as:
k￿
i;t = d0;i + d1(￿yi;t + (1 ￿ ￿)ki;t￿1) + d2￿￿￿;i;t + d3cfi;t + ￿t; (17)
where ￿t is a time-speci￿c e⁄ect and the constant in (10) is captured in d0;i,
which is a ￿rm-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ect. That is, the means of the exogenous shocks,
included in the constant term v in (10), are treated as ￿rm-speci￿c. The desired
stock of capital in (17) represents the capital choice the ￿rm would make if
required to choose its investments one period ahead under uncertainty.8
To allow for a separation between the short-run dynamic e⁄ects from the ef-
fects on the long-run stock of capital, I take an error-correction approach in the
empirical work. Error-correction models have been used in several investment
studies on micro-data (see e.g. the recent overview by Bond and van Reenen,
2002, and references therein). Following the standard approach, the error-
8If the ￿rm faces any type of adjustment restriction, we need to think of (17) as the capital
the ￿rm would choose, given that the adjustment restrictions were lifted in this period but
would be binding in all future periods.
12correction speci￿cation is derived by ￿rst specifying the dynamic adjustment
mechanism between desired and actual capital as an autoregressive-distributed
lag (ADL), i.e.:
ki;t = a11ki;t￿1 + a12ki;t￿2 + a21(￿yi;t + (1 ￿ ￿)ki;t￿1) + a22￿￿￿;i;t (18)
+a23cfi;t + a24(￿yi;t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)ki;t￿2) + a25￿￿￿;i;t￿1 + a26cfi;t￿1
+a0;i + tt + ui;t;
where a0;i is a ￿rm-speci￿c e⁄ect, tt a time-speci￿c e⁄ect and ui;t a random
error. The expression (18) corresponds to an ADL(2;1) function.9 Rewriting
(18) into an error-correction form yields the baseline speci￿cation in this paper
(see Appendix B for details), i.e.:
￿ki;t = b1￿ki;t￿1 + b2￿yi;t + b3￿￿￿￿;i;t (19)
+b4￿cfi;t + b5(yi;t￿1 ￿ ki;t￿2) + b6ki;t￿2
+b7￿￿￿;i;t￿1 + b8cfi;t￿1 + a0;i + tt + ui;t:













The ￿rst important point to note is that, by construction, the error term, ui;t,
does not include a technology shock, in contrast to the paper by e.g. von Kalck-
reuth (2000), or any other shocks in the benchmark model above. Here, shocks
to the determinants are not treated as a residual; instead they are included in
the measure of k￿
i;t.
Second, the empirical speci￿cation, (19), includes a lagged dependent vari-
able as well as ￿xed e⁄ects. As pointed out by Nickell (1981), applying the
9The asymmetry in the ADL function is due to the ￿rm￿ s investment incentives being
governed by k￿
t ￿ kt￿1, and not by k￿
t ￿ kt, in the model derived above.
13within transformation yields biased and inconsistent estimates in this situation.
Instead, I take the approach suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991). Thus,
the ￿xed e⁄ects are eliminated by taking ￿rst di⁄erences, a procedure that in-
troduces a ￿rst-order MA process into the residual, i.e. ￿ui;t, which, in turn,
implies that the ￿rst di⁄erence of the lagged dependent variable and the residual
will be correlated. This problem is addressed by using instrumental variables
techniques. Under the assumption that ui;t is not serially correlated, levels of
￿ki;t￿s for s ￿ 2 are valid instruments. However, since ki;t￿2 is included in
(19) and the estimation is performed in ￿rst di⁄erences only, ￿ki;t￿s for s ￿ 3
are used as level instruments to avoid multicollinearity problems in the ￿ ￿rst
stage￿ .10 In line with the ￿rst point above, all other variables are treated as
exogenous.
As is generally the case for an asymptotically e¢ cient GMM estimation, the
instrument set grows by t. However, lags become less informative as instru-
ments as the lag order increases. To avoid including irrelevant instruments, it
is sensible not to include the whole history. Here, ￿ki;t￿s with s ￿ 7 is not
included as level instruments in the instrument set, that is, the growth rate of
capital for more than ￿ve years back is not considered to be informative for the
current one.11
A concern with the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator is that the estimated
standard errors from the second step may be downward biased in ￿nite samples.
However, the estimated standard errors from the ￿rst step do not seem to su⁄er
from this problem (see e.g. Arellano and Bond, 1991). I therefore rely on
￿rst-step estimates, together with ￿rst-step heteroscedasticity robust standard
errors.
10That is, since ki;t￿2 is included as an exogenous variable in the speci￿cation and esti-
mation is performed in ￿rst di⁄erences, ￿ki;t￿2 will already be included in the instrument
set.
11The results are insensitive to including additional lags.
146 Results
Table 1 presents the estimation results. The Sargan test of the over-identifying
restrictions cannot reject the null hypothesis of a correctly speci￿ed model and
valid instruments in any of the speci￿cations. Moreover, there is no evidence of
second-order autocorrelation in the di⁄erenced residuals in any of the speci￿ca-
tions. Thus, the chosen lag speci￿cation seems to be appropriate. In column
(1) of table 1, the results from estimating equation (19) are presented. Focusing
on the short-run estimates in column (I), we see that increasing the uncertainty
indicator has a signi￿cantly negative short-run e⁄ect on capital growth. The es-
timate for ￿￿￿￿;i;t is -0:22. We can also see that lagged capital growth (￿ki;t￿1)
and the output growth terms (￿yi;t) enter signi￿cantly with the expected signs,
i.e. -0:42 and 0:12, respectively. When turning to the long-run estimates, we
see that the uncertainty indicator has a signi￿cantly negative long-run e⁄ect on
the stock of capital. The long-run estimate for ￿￿￿;i is -0:40. Moreover, the
long-run estimate for yi is signi￿cantly positive, 0:35. It is also interesting to
see that the (yi;t￿1 ￿ki;t￿2) term enters signi￿cantly with a positive sign, 0:18,
which is consistent with error correction behavior. However, the results do not
indicate that cash ￿ ow e⁄ects are an important determinant of capital growth,
neither in the short- nor in the long-run.
The theory outlined in section 3 identi￿es two counteracting forces on invest-
ment from increased uncertainty about technology and the real ￿ exible factor
price. There is a positive e⁄ect working through the convexity of the future mar-
ginal returns to capital and a negative option e⁄ect due to irreversible capital
expenditures. The observed negative, short-run and long-run, e⁄ects on capital
accumulation thus support the view that the predominant e⁄ect on investment
from increased uncertainty stems from the negative option e⁄ect as opposed to
the convexity channel.
If irreversibility constraints are present, there may also be important nonlin-
ear e⁄ects in the short-run responses to investment incentives. To explore this,























Long-run estimate for yi 0.354** 0.381**
(0.076) (0.089)
Long-run estimate for ￿￿￿;i -0.398* -0.443*
(0.178) (0.196)
Long-run estimate for cfi 0.053 0.054
(0.041) (0.042)
Number of Observations 2387 2387
AR(2) (P-value) [0.48] [0.50]
Sargan (P-value) [0.20] [0.25]
Notes: Sample 1986-1992 with 341 ￿rms. * (**) denotes signi￿cance at the 5 (1)
percent level. The estimation is performed using the Arellano and Bond (1991)
GMM system estimator calculated with DPD 1.2 for Ox. See the main text
for the instruments used. One-step coe¢ cients with heteroscedasticity robust
standard errors in parenthesis. The standard errors for the long-run estimates
are computed using the delta method (see Greene, 2000). AR(2) denotes the p-
value for the test of second-order autocorrelation in the ￿rst di⁄erenced residuals.
Sargan denotes the p-value of the joint test of model speci￿cation and instrument
validity. A full set of time dummies is included in both (I) and (II).
(￿yi;t)2 is included, since changes in investment incentives, for a given level of
uncertainty, may have a non-linear e⁄ect on capital growth. The term (￿yi;t)2
16is expected to enter with a positive sign, because irreversibility may prevent the
capital stock from falling when investment incentives fall. The term ￿yi;t￿￿￿;i;t
is included since increasing the level of uncertainty may reduce the response to a
given increase in investment incentives due to increased investment thresholds.
The expected sign of ￿yi;t￿￿￿;i;t is then negative. The result from including
these two terms in the speci￿cation (19) is presented in column (II) of table 1.
Although both terms enter with the sign to be expected if capital is irreversible,
neither are signi￿cant. Another observation is that when comparing the results
between columns (I) and (II) of table 1, we see that none of the other estimates
are qualitatively a⁄ected when these terms are included.
How large are the e⁄ects of increased uncertainty? To shed some light on
this question, it is informative to calculate the e⁄ect of a one-standard deviation
increase in ￿￿￿;i;t. Here, the within standard deviation is used to capture the
typical variation for a ￿rm (see the Appendix A). Using the estimates from
column (I) in table 1, the results indicate that the growth rate of capital would
fall by 1:24 percentage units in the short run (i.e. from a mean growth rate
of 7:65 percent per annum). This, in turn, implies that investments would fall
by approximately 16 percent on impact. Moreover, if the increase in ￿￿￿;i;t is
permanent, the long-run stock of capital would fall by about 2 percent.12 Thus,
the results indicate that the short-run e⁄ect of increased uncertainty is large,
whereas the long-run e⁄ect is more moderate.
7 Concluding Discussion
The theoretical prediction for the investment-uncertainty relationship is am-
biguous and the dynamics are potentially quite intricate. The aim of this paper
is to provide empirical evidence on this relationship employing a theory based
speci￿cation on micro-data for Swedish manufacturing ￿rms.
A novelty in this paper is that the ￿rm-level uncertainty indicator is mo-
12This estimate is for an unchanged y: However, allowing for changes in y has a very small
e⁄ect on the result (see Appendix B).
17tivated and derived from an investment model. More speci￿cally, I rely on a
neoclassical investment model with time to build. This model is also used as the
base for the empirical work where an error-correction approach is employed to
separate the short-run dynamic e⁄ects from the e⁄ects on the long-run capital
stock.
I ￿nd increased uncertainty to have a negative e⁄ect on capital accumula-
tion in the short- as well as in the long-run. This cannot be explained by the
neoclassical investment model with time to build alone. Instead, the results sug-
gest that the predominant e⁄ect on investment of increased uncertainty stems
from irreversible capital expenditures. The results in this paper thus add more
evidence for the view that there is a negative relationship between investment
and uncertainty.
The ￿nding of a negative sign in the investment - uncertainty relationship
is in line with a closely related paper by Carlsson and LasØen (2002). Carlsson
and LasØen study the capital adjustment process for the same ￿rms as in this
paper. One of the main ￿ndings is that the actual adjustment patterns are
well captured by a stylized model with irreversible capital, thus lending indirect
support to the ￿ndings here.
I also experiment with allowing for nonlinearities in the short-run responses
to investment incentives. It is interesting to see that the signs of these terms
are consistent with the presence of irreversibility constraints, though, none of
them are statistically signi￿cant.
Quantifying the results I ￿nd that the short-run e⁄ect of increased uncer-
tainty is large, whereas the long-run e⁄ect is more moderate. The estimates
imply that an increase of one (within) standard deviation in the uncertainty
measure gives rise to a fall in the investment level of about 16 percent on im-
pact and, if the increase is permanent, a decline in the long-run stock of capital
of 2 percent.
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218 Appendix A - Data
The data used in this paper is extracted from the CoSta database, described in
Hansen (1999). The sample of ￿rms was ￿rst selected as follows:
￿ Only ￿rms classi￿ed within industries 31-38 according to the SNI69 clas-
si￿cation system, i.e. the manufacturing sector, are included.
￿ Only ￿rms that are continuously operating throughout the sample period
are included.
￿ Only ￿rms classi￿ed as an ordinary company and an identical/comparable
￿rm from last year in all years are included.
The variables are de￿ned below in terms of those in the CoSta database (see
Hansen 1999). To be clear about what is ￿rm-speci￿c and what is industry-
speci￿c the sub-index j for the three-digit industry or, in some cases, two-digit,
to which ￿rm i belongs is introduced.
Output Yi;t = V ar005i;t=PPIj;t, where V ar005 is operating income and
PPI is a three-digit industry-speci￿c producer price index supplied by Statistics
Sweden. For industries where a three-digit producer price index is missing, a
two-digit producer price index is instead used.
The Stock of Capital Ki;t is the stock of machinery and equipment gen-
erated using the perpetual inventory method, i.e.:
Ki;t = (1 ￿ ￿j)Ki;t￿1 + Ii;t; (21)
where ￿j is the depreciation rate and Ii;t is investments in machinery and equip-
ment. When calculating three-digit depreciation rates for machinery and equip-
ment, the estimated industry-speci￿c service lives (SLj) are taken from the
BEA publication ￿ Fixed Reproducible Tangible Wealth In the United States,
1925-89￿and the estimated declining balance rate (DBR) for machinery and
equipment, assumed to be equal for all manufacturing industries (1:65), is taken
from the BEA publication ￿ Improved Estimates of Fixed Reproducible Tangi-
ble Wealth, 1929-1995￿ by Katz and Herman (1997). The depreciation rate
22is then calculated as ￿j = DBR=SLj. Unfortunately, in most cases, one
must resort to an estimate of the service life for two-digit industries. Invest-
ments are de￿ned as Ii;t = (V ar115i;t + V ar119i;t ￿ V ar127i;t)=IPIj;t, where
V ar115i;t + V ar119i;t ￿ V ar127i;t is net machinery and equipment capital ex-
penditures, IPIj;t is the two-digit investment de￿ ator compiled from investment
series for machinery and equipment in current and ￿xed prices collected from
SM series N, Statistics Sweden. As starting value for the stock of capital, I use
the value according to plan of machinery and equipment (V ar146i;1979) de￿ ated
by IPIj;1979.
Cash Flow (CFi;t) is de￿ned as V ar011i;t+V ar016i;t￿V ar021i;t+V ar028i;t￿
V ar047i;t, where V ar011i;t is the sum of operating pro￿ts before depreciation,
V ar016i;t is ￿nancial income, V ar021i;t ￿nancial expenses, V ar028i;t allocation
to untaxed reserves and V ar047i;t is taxes.
For the ￿rm to be included in the sample, I also require it to have a stock
of capital and capital expenditures, i.e. (V ar115i;t + V ar119i;t), and a market
value of sold machinery and equipment, i.e. V ar127i;t, that are non-negative in
all time periods, which leaves a sample of 341 ￿rms.
23Table 2: Summary Statistics
Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
Overall Between Within
￿ki;t 0.077 0.175 0.065 0.163 -0.752 1.587
￿yi;t 0.002 0.136 0.051 0.126 -1.271 1.411
(￿yi;t ￿ ￿cj;t) 0.010 0.167 0.048 0.160 -1.284 1.312
￿￿￿￿;i;t 0.003 0.058 0.015 0.057 -0.324 0.718
￿cfi;t -0.052 0.720 0.138 0.706 -15.578 10.672
(yi;t ￿ ki;t￿1) 1.684 0.682 0.616 0.294 -0.983 3.945
(yi;t ￿ ki;t￿1 ￿ cj;t) 3.050 0.671 0.605 0.292 0.624 5.288
ki;t 9.771 1.374 1.353 0.249 5.764 13.999
￿￿￿;i;t 0.096 0.086 0.063 0.059 0.002 1.170
cfi;t 0.660 0.789 0.541 0.576 -7.653 17.887
Notes: Sample 1986-1992 with 341 ￿rms.
In table 2, I report some summary statistics for the variables used in the
paper. Each variable is decomposed into a between (xi) and a within (xi;t ￿
xi+x) where x is the overall mean. The within and between standard deviations
do not sum to the overall standard deviation, since the small sample corrected
variance estimates on which they are based are corrected with di⁄erent factors.
249 Appendix B - Derivation of the Error-Correction
Model
The derivation of the error-correction speci￿cation follows the standard ap-
proach and starts by specifying the dynamic adjustment mechanism between
k and k￿ as an autoregressive-distributed lag (ADL):
ki;t = a11ki;t￿1 + a12ki;t￿2 + a21(￿yi;t + (1 ￿ ￿)ki;t￿1) + a22￿￿￿;i;t (22)
+a23cfi;t + a24(￿yi;t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)ki;t￿2) + a25￿￿￿;i;t￿1 + a26cfi;t￿1
+a0;i + tt + ui;t;
where an asymmetric lag structure (i.e. an ADL(2;1)) is used. This structure is
consistent with the model outlined above, where the capital adjustment incen-
tives are governed by k￿
i;t ￿ki;t￿1 and not by k￿
i;t ￿ki;t. Taking standard steps,
(22) can be rewritten as:
￿ki;t = (a11 ￿ 1)￿ki;t￿1 + a21￿(￿yi;t + (1 ￿ ￿)ki;t￿1) + a22￿￿￿￿;i;t(23)
+a23￿cfi;t + (a21 + a24)(￿yi;t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)ki;t￿2 ￿ ki;t￿2)
+(a21 + a24 + a11 + a12 ￿ 1)ki;t￿2 + (a22 + a25)￿￿￿;i;t￿1
+(a23 + a26)cfi;t￿1 + a0;i + tt + ui;t:
The expression (23) can be rewritten as:
￿ki;t = (a11 ￿ 1 + a21(1 ￿ ￿))￿ki;t￿1 + a21￿￿yi;t + a22￿￿￿￿;i;t (24)
+a23￿cfi;t + (a21 + a24)￿ (yi;t￿1 ￿ ki;t￿2)
+(a21 + a24 + a11 + a12 ￿ 1)ki;t￿2 + (a22 + a25)￿￿￿;i;t￿1
+(a23 + a26)cfi;t￿1 + a0;i + tt + ui;t;
where all terms containing ￿ki;t￿1 have been collected. This is useful since
this term needs to be instrumented (see section 5 above). The reduced form
25error-correction speci￿cation is then given by:
￿ki;t = b1￿ki;t￿1 + b2￿yi;t + b3￿￿￿￿;i;t (25)
+b4￿cfi;t + b5(yi;t￿1 ￿ ki;t￿2) + b6ki;t￿2
+b7￿￿￿;i;t￿1 + b8cfi;t￿1 + a0;i + tt + ui;t;
where:
b1 = (a11 ￿ 1 + a21(1 ￿ ￿)); b2 = a21￿;
b3 = a22; b4 = a23;
b5 = (a21 + a24)￿; b6 = (a21 + a24 + a11 + a12 ￿ 1);
b7 = (a22 + a25) b8 = (a23 + a26):
The long-run solution of the ADL is given by (ignoring the constant and the
time e⁄ect):
ki = a11ki + a12ki + a21￿yi + a21(1 ￿ ￿)ki + a22￿￿￿;i + a23cfi (26)
+a24￿yi + a24(1 ￿ ￿)ki + a25￿￿￿;i + a26cfi:











where ￿ = (1 ￿ a11 ￿ a12 ￿ a21 ￿ a24 + (a21 + a24)￿). In terms of the reduced











Since there will be a drift in k due to the drift in exogenous variables we need
to think about the long-run solution in (28) as the k the ￿rm would chose in
the long-run given the values of the exogenous variables today (including the
values for ￿￿￿ and cf) and if these values would prevail in all future periods.
Note that the long-run solution in (28) is for a constant y, but if k changes
y will change. However, as argued below, this should have a very small impact





k + ￿, (29)
26where we have used that the long-run solution maps the long-run solution of
endogenous variables for the value of the exogenous determinants today - thus
in (29) a and pF (i.e. the log of technology and the prices of ￿ exible factors)
are treated as constant and included in the constant ￿. Then using (29) to
























1￿￿ ￿ ￿, where ￿ is the average cost share of equipment capital
in total revenue, we ￿nd that ￿ = (1￿0:354￿0:065)￿1 = 1:024. Thus, allowing
for y to change when calculating the long-run e⁄ect on k from an increase in
￿￿￿ will have a very small e⁄ect on the result.
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